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Abstract. We consider the security of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)
in the setting of multiple Trusted Authorities (TAs). In this multi-TA
setting, we envisage multiple TAs sharing some common parameters, but
each TA generating its own master secrets and master public keys. We
provide security notions and security models for the multi-TA setting
which can be seen as natural extensions of existing notions and mod-
els for the single-TA setting. In addition, we study the concept of TA
anonymity, which formally models the inability of an adversary to dis-
tinguish two ciphertexts corresponding to the same message and identity
but generated using diﬀerent TA master public keys. We argue that this
anonymity property is a natural one of importance in enhancing pri-
vacy and limiting traﬃc analysis in multi-TA environments. We study
a modiﬁed version of a Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion in the multi-TA
setting, proving that our modiﬁcation lifts security and anonymity prop-
erties from the CPA to the CCA setting. Finally, we apply these results
to study the security of the Boneh-Franklin and Sakai-Kasahara IBE
schemes in the multi-TA setting.
Keywords: identity-based encryption, multi-TA IBE, anonymity, mul-
tiple trusted authorities.
1 Introduction
The concept of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was ﬁrst introduced by Shamir
in [23]. In identity-based cryptography(IBC), arbitrary identifying strings such
as e-mail addresses or IP addresses can be used to form public keys for users, with
the corresponding private keys being created by a Trusted Authority (TA) who
is in possession of a system-wide master secret. Then a party Alice who wishes,
for example, to encrypt to a party Bob need only know Bob’s identiﬁer and the
system-wide public parameters. This approach eliminates certiﬁcates and the
associated processing and management overheads from public key cryptography.
The ﬁrst eﬃcient and secure constructions for IBE were not forthcoming till
the work of Cocks [12], and the pairing-based solutions of Sakai, Ohigishi and
Kasahara [22] and Boneh and Franklin [6]. Boneh and Franklin [6] also proposed
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the ﬁrst security models for IBE and gave schemes secure in the random oracle
model [5]. Since the publication of these ﬁrst results, there has been an explosion
of interest in IBE and related cryptographic primitives.
1.1 Motivation and Contributions
Historically, anonymous encryption was motivated in the context of mobile com-
munication. In the standard public key setting, an entity B sends a user A ci-
phertexts of messages encrypted under A’s public key (and vice versa), over a
wireless network. It is reasonable to assume that A and B will want to keep
their identities hidden from an eavesdropper who can see all ciphertexts on the
network. This is possible only when ciphertexts do not leak information about
the public keys used to create them, a notion formalised as key-privacy in [4].
If an IBE scheme is used instead of a standard public key scheme, the equiv-
alent notion is that of recipient anonymity: the ciphertext should not leak the
identity of the (intended) recipient. In this setting, we assume that there is a
single global TA issuing keys to all users in the system, and that all ciphertexts
are created using the public parameters of that single global TA. With a small
number of exceptions (upon which we elaborate in the related work section be-
low), the security models proposed for IBE to date all consider such a single-TA
setting.
It is however possible to envisage scenarios as above but with multiple, in-
dependent TAs (perhaps sharing some common system parameters). In some
applications, each user may only have a single private key issued by one of the
TAs, while in others, users could have multiple private keys for the same iden-
tity string with the diﬀerent private keys being issued by diﬀerent TAs. In both
settings, in addition to the usual IBE security notions of indistinguishability and
recipient anonymity, the notion of TA anonymity arises as being both natural
and of fundamental importance. Here, we desire that an adversary should ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to distinguish ciphertexts produced using diﬀerent TA master pub-
lic keys, even if the ciphertext is for the same message and identity string. As
well as being a natural security notion for the multi-TA setting, TA anonymity
may have practical signiﬁcance. For example, we can imagine a coalition of TAs
operating in a wireless setting where all ciphertexts can be captured from the
network by an adversary. In such a scenario, if the ciphertext were to somehow
leak the identity of the TA, then this would open up avenues for traﬃc analysis.
In a hostile environment, traﬃc analysis can lead to the leaking of information
relating to which entities are communicating and how frequently, which can often
reveal important intelligence about the nature of operations.
In this paper we extend the usual indistinguishability and recipient anonymity
notions for IBE security to the multi-TA setting, and, in addition, formalize the
notionofTAanonymity.We introduce amodiﬁedversionofthe Fujisaki-Okamoto
conversionforthemulti-TAsetting,provingthatourmodiﬁedtransformationlifts
security and anonymity properties from the CPA to the CCA setting. We then
apply these results to study the security and anonymity of the Boneh-Franklin [6]
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As well as formalising the notion of TA anonymity, our work also establishes
new results concerning the recipient anonymity of important IBE schemes. For
example, to the best of our knowledge, no CCA-secure variant of the Boneh-
Franklin IBE scheme was previously known to have recipient anonymity. More-
over, we show that the Sakai-Kasahara scheme (and a CCA-secure variant of it)
enjoys recipient anonymity, contradicting a claim of [7].
1.2 Related Work
Anonymity. In the standard public key setting, the notion of key-privacy [4]
captures the requirement that an adversary in possession of a ciphertext cannot
tell which public key was used to create the ciphertext, i.e the ciphertext should
not leak information about the public key. The equivalent notion in the IBE set-
ting is the notion of recipient anonymity, i.e the ciphertext should not leak the
identity of the recipient. The systematic study of recipient anonymity was initi-
ated in [1], motivated both by its intrinsic interest in IBE and for its application
in constructing PEKS (Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search) schemes
from IBE schemes. Since then, recipient anonymity has quickly become a stan-
dard security property for IBE schemes. IBE schemes known to oﬀer recipient
anonymity include the CPA-secure BasicIdent scheme of Boneh and Franklin
[6] and the IBE schemes of Gentry [16].
Multi-TA Security for IBE. Holt [18] also considered security of IBE in
the multi-TA setting, motivated by earlier work on anonymous credential sys-
tems [19,9]. Two notions of key privacy for IBE were outlined in [18]. The ﬁrst,
termed “identity-based indistinguishability of identity under chosen plaintext
attack” (ID-II-CPA), is just the standard single-TA recipient anonymity notion.
The second is termed “identity-based indistinguishability of key generator under
chosen plaintext attack” (ID-IKG-CPA), and is roughly similar to our notion of
multi-TA TA anonymity under chosen plaintext attack (m-TAA-CPA). However,
the ID-IKG-CPA security model in [18], while allowing corruption of TAs, does
not allow the adversary to extract any user private keys at all. Our m-TAA-CPA
model is strictly stronger, allowing both corruption of TAs and extraction of pri-
vate keys (even for the challenge TA)1. Moreover, [18] only considers the CPA
setting, showing that the BasicIdent scheme of [6] has ID-II-CPA and ID-IKG-
CPA security. However, even the proofs for these CPA cases are at best informal.
In this paper, we consider the CCA setting, use stronger security notions, and
give rigorous proofs.
Wang and Cao [24] gave examples of IBE schemes enjoying reduced ciphertext
expansion and reduced computation when the sender sends the same message
to a single identity using multiple, diﬀerent master public keys belonging to
diﬀerent TAs, such that the message can be recovered with a private key issued
1 Holt’s work allows the adversary to dynamically instantiate new TAs during its
attack but without any adversarial input to the set up process, while we set up all
the TAs at the start of the security games. These two approaches are easily seen to
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for that identity by any one of the TAs. However, the security models presented
in [24] are the standard single-TA, indistinguishability-based security models,
and no consideration is given to how security may be aﬀected by encrypting the
same message using multiple master public keys. In addition, the schemes of [24]
reuse randomness to enhance eﬃciency, and this is not formally addressed in the
security analysis. Barbosa and Farshim [3] consider the security of multi-recipient
IBE with randomness re-use, but only in the single-TA setting.
Chase [10] has considered Attribute Based Encryption (ABE), a generalisation
of IBE, in the setting of multiple authorities. In her work, a user is equipped
with private keys corresponding to attributes from diﬀerent TAs and the user is
only able to decrypt a ciphertext if he possesses a threshold of attributes from
diﬀerent TAs. Chase does not seem to consider the issue of TA anonymity.
Anonymity for Hierarchical IBE. Anonymity properties for IBE have al-
ready been studied in the hierarchical setting [1,8]. Anonymous Hierarchical IBE
(AHIBE) is related to, but diﬀerent from, our notion of TA anonymity for IBE.
In AHIBE, a single root TA generates public parameters and a master secret,
using which the master secrets of all sub-TAs are produced. Ciphertexts are
then anonymous, in that an adversary cannot distinguish which identity was
used when producing a ciphertext, where now identities are comprised of a vec-
tor of strings identifying a hierarchy of TAs and a ﬁnal user. On other hand,
in our multi-TA setting, there is no single root authority, but rather a group of
independent TAs (who may share some common parameters). The “right” gen-
eralisation of our multi-TA IBE concept to the hierarchical setting would then
involve multiple, independent root TAs, each being the root of a tree of TAs
and users. Thus we would have a forest of trees, and would then wish to study
anonymity properties of ciphertexts in this multi-HIBE setting. We leave further
development of this line of research to future work.
Fujisaki-Okamoto Conversions. Yang et al. [25] and Kitagawa et al. [20]
considered the adaptation of the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversions of [14] and [13]
to the IBE setting, showing that simple modiﬁcations of the original Fujisaki-
Okamoto approaches can be used to build IBE schemes with IND-CCA security
from schemes having only OW-CPA and IND-CPA security, respectively, in the
random oracle model. We adapt the Fujisaki-Okamoto technique of [13] to the
multi-TA setting, showing how it lifts security and anonymity properties from
the CPA to the CCA setting.
2 Background and Deﬁnitions
In this section, we provide basic deﬁnitions needed for the remainder of the
paper.
Deﬁnition 1. A pairing-friendly group generator PairingGen is a polynomial
time algorithm with input 1k and output a tuple (G,GT,e,q,P).H e r eG,GT are
groups of prime order q, P generates G,a n de : G × G → GT is a bilinear,358 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
non-degenerate and eﬃciently computable map. By convention, G is an additive
group and GT multiplicative.
For ease of presentation, we work exclusively in the setting where e is symmetric;
our deﬁnitions and results can be generalised to the asymmetric setting where e :
G1×G2 → GT,w i t hG1 and G2 being diﬀerent groups. Further details concerning
the basic choices that are available when using pairings in cryptography can be
found in [15].
Deﬁnition 2. Af u n c t i o n (k) is said to be negligible if, for every c,t h e r ee x i s t s
kc such that  (k) ≤ k−c for every k ≥ kc.
Deﬁnition 3. We deﬁne the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the Bilinear
Diﬃe-Hellman (BDH) problem in (G,GT) to be:
AdvBDH
A (k)=P r ( A(aP,bP,cP)=e(P,P)abc)
where a,b,c ← Zq. Here, we implicitly assume that parameters (G,GT,e,q,P)
are given to A as additional inputs. We say that the BDH problem is hard in
(G,GT) if no polynomial-time algorithm that solves the BDH problem in (G,GT)
has a non-negligible advantage.
Deﬁnition 4. We deﬁne the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the  -
Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Inversion ( -BDHI) problem in (G,GT) to be:
Adv -BDHI
A (k)=P r ( A(xP,x
2P,...,x
 P)=e(P,P)
1/x)
where x ← Zq. Here, we implicitly assume that parameters (G,GT,e,q,P) are
given to A as additional inputs. We say that the  -BDHI problem is hard in
(G,GT) if no polynomial-time algorithm that solves the  -BDHI problem in
(G,GT) has a non-negligible advantage.
Deﬁnition 5. A (single-TA) IBE scheme is deﬁned in terms of four algorithms:
– Setup: On input 1k, outputs a master public key mpk which includes system
parameters params, and a master secret key msk. We assume that params
contains descriptions of the message and ciphertext spaces, MsgSp and CtSp,
and that MsgSp ⊂{ 0,1}∗.
– KeyDer: A key derivation algorithm that on input mpk, msk and identiﬁer
id ∈{ 0,1}∗, returns a private key uskid. This algorithm may or may not be
randomized.
– Enc: An encryption algorithm that on input mpk,i d e n t i ﬁ e rid ∈{ 0,1}∗ and
message m ∈ MsgSp, returns a ciphertext c ∈ CtSp. This algorithm is usually
randomized; in subsequent descriptions, we will write c = Enc(mpk,id,m;r)
when we wish to emphasize that randomness r (drawn from some space RSp)
is used when performing an encryption.
– Dec: A decryption algorithm that on input mpk,ap r i v a t ek e yuskid and
a ciphertext c ∈ CtSp, returns either a message m ∈ MsgSp or a failure
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These algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency requirement that de-
cryption undoes encryption, i.e. ∀m ∈ MsgSp,Dec(mpk,uskid,c)=m where
c = Enc(mpk,id,m).
3 Multi-TA Security
We formalize IBE in the multi-TA setting and the associated notions of security.
A multi-TA IBE scheme is deﬁned in terms of ﬁve algorithms:
– CommonSetup: On input 1k, outputs params, a set of system parameters
shared by all TAs; TA= {tai :1≤ i ≤ n} will represent the set of (labels
of) TAs, where n = n(k) ∈ N.
– TASetup: On input params, outputs a master public key mpk (which includes
params), and a master secret key msk. This algorithm is randomized and
executed independently for each TA in TA .
– KeyDer, Enc, Dec: These are all as per a normal IBE scheme.
Note that we explicitly include a CommonSetup algorithm which outputs params,
a set of system parameters shared by all TAs. The diﬀerent TAs will of course
have diﬀerent master public keys and master secret keys. Our model is capable
of handling situations where no such common system parameters are used, sim-
ply by setting params to be the security parameter 1k. Nevertheless, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the diﬀerent TAs may share some common system
parameters (e.g. the output of a pairing parameter generator in the Boneh-
Franklin IBE scheme), since cryptographic schemes and related parameters are
often standardised by bodies like ISO, NIST or IEEE P1363, and then used in
multiple domains by diﬀerent authorities. Indeed, the IEEE P1363.3 working
group aims to produce a set of standards speciﬁc to identity based cryptography
and we may expect speciﬁc recommendations for cryptographic parameters to
be produced by this group in due course. For the concrete schemes considered
in this paper, common parameters are needed in order to achieve our notion of
TA anonymity; doing so without having some (non-trivial) common parameters
is an interesting open problem.
We also need a standard consistency requirement on such a scheme. In ad-
dition, in applications, we may require a robustness condition – decrypting a
ciphertext created using an identity and the master public key of one TA should
fail to decrypt using a private key for that (or any other) identity issued by
another TA. We return to this issue in Section 5.
In the security games deﬁned below, TASet represents the set of TAs that
have been compromised, i.e queried for their master secret keys, IDSetta repre-
sents the set of identities queried for private keys for each ta ∈TA , while CSetta
represents the set of identity/ciphertext pairs on which decryption queries have
been performed for each ta ∈TA . In these games, MPK = {mpkta : ta ∈TA }
and MSK = {mskta : ta ∈T A }represent the set of all master public keys
and all master secret keys, respectively. For each experiment deﬁned below,360 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
we associate to an adversary A and a bit b ∈{ 0,1}, the advantage of the adver-
sary for a given “notion-attack” combination, which is deﬁned as:
Advnotion-atk
A (k)=


Pr[Expnotion-atk-1
A (k)=1 ]− Pr[Expnotion-atk-0
A (k)=1 ]



A scheme is said to be “notion-atk”-secure if the advantage of all PPT adver-
saries is negligible as a function of the security parameter k.
We focus below on Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCA) for three diﬀerent se-
curity notions: indistinguishability, recipient anonymity and TA anonymity. Re-
moving adversarial access to decryption oracles gives the same notions of security
against a Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA).
In each of the ﬁrst two cases (namely, indistinguishability of messages and
recipient anonymity), setting n = 1 and removing access to the Corrupt oracle
gives us a security notion that coincides with a known (single-TA) IBE security
notion. Formally, to obtain a (single-TA) IBE scheme, we need to combine the
CommonSetupand TASetupalgorithms of the multi-TA scheme into a single Setup
algorithm. In what follows, we will refer to this scheme as being the corresponding
single-TA IBE scheme. In the third case, TA anonymity, the security notion is
inappropriate for the single-TA setting.
3.1 m-IND-CCA Security
We ﬁrst deﬁne the m-IND-CCA security notion that captures indistinguishabil-
ity of messages under chosen ciphertext attacks in the multi-TA setting.
Experiment Expm-IND-CCA-b
A (k)
params ← CommonSetup(1
k)
TASet ←∅
∀ta ∈TA ,( mpkta,mskta) ← TASetup(params)
IDSetta ←∅ , CSetta ←∅
(ta,id,m0,m1,state) ←
ACorrupt,KeyDer,Dec(find,MPK)
c
∗ ← Enc(mpkta,id,mb)
b
  ←A Corrupt,KeyDer,Dec(guess,c
∗,state)
If {m0,m1}   MsgSp or |m0|  = |m1| or m0 = m1
then return 0
If ta / ∈ TASet, id / ∈ IDSetta and (id,c
∗) / ∈ CSetta
then return b
  else return 0
Oracle Corrupt(ta)
TASet ← TASet ∪{ ta}
Return mskta
Oracle KeyDer(ta,id)
IDSetta ← IDSetta ∪{ id}
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
Return uskid,ta
Oracle Dec(ta,id,c)
CSetta ← CSetta ∪ (id,c)
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
m ← Dec(mpkta,uskid,ta,c)
Return m
The following theorem relates the m-IND-CCA security of a multi-TA IBE
scheme to the IND-CCA security of the corresponding single-TA IBE scheme.
Theorem 1. Let atk ∈{ CPA,CCA}. Then for any m-IND-atk adversary A
against a multi-TA IBE scheme with n TAs having advantage ε and running in
time t, there exists an IND-atk adversary B against the corresponding single-TA
IBE scheme with advantage ε
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Proof. Suppose there is an m-IND-atk adversary A against a multi-TA IBE
scheme having advantage ε and running in time t. We show how to construct
an algorithm B that uses A to break the IND-atk security of the corresponding
single-TA IBE scheme.
B’s input from its challenger is the public key mpk of the single-TA scheme
which, by our deﬁnitions, includes some public parameters params that are out-
put by the CommonSetup part of the Setup algorithm of the single-TA scheme.
B’s task is to break the IND-atk property of the scheme and it does this by
acting as a challenger for A.
B ﬁrst sets up a multi-TA IBE scheme. It does this by ﬁrst taking params
from the public key of the single-TA scheme. If n is the number of TAs in the
multi-TA setting, it ﬁrst picks i
$ ←{ 1,...n} and sets mpktai = mpk (note it does
not know the corresponding master secret key for this TA). For the remaining
n−1 TAs it generates the master public keys and master secret keys itself using
the TASetup algorithm. B now gives the set of n master public keys to A.
A then makes a series of TA corrupt queries, extraction queries (and decryp-
tion queries in the CCA setting) which B answers using either its knowledge of
the relevant master secret key or by relaying queries to its own challenger. If A
makes a corrupt query on tai then B aborts the simulation.
A also makes a single query in the challenge phase; if A’s selected TA in this
phase is not tai,t h e nB aborts, otherwise B again uses its own challenger to
answer the query. When A terminates by outputting a bit b , B simply relays
this bit to its challenger.
This completes our description of B’s simulation. Note that A’a view of the
simulation is identical to its view in a real attack, unless B aborts. Moreover B’s
output b  is correct if A’s is. It is easy to see that B aborts with probability 1/n
and that B runs in time O(time(A)). The result follows.
3.2 m-RA-CCA Security
Our m-RA-CCA security notion captures the notion of recipient anonymity in
the presence of chosen ciphertext attackers, in the multi-TA setting. The single-
TA version of the m-RA-CPA security notion was studied in detail in [1], where
it was named IBE-ANO-CPA security.
Halevi [17] provides a simple suﬃcient condition for an IND-CPA public key
encryption scheme to have key-privacy: given public keys pk0 and pk1 and the
encryption of a random message under pkb for a bit b chosen at random, even a
computationally unbounded adversary should have negligible advantage in de-
termining which public key was used. Abdalla et al. [1] extended this condition to
study recipient anonymity of IND-CPA-secure IBE schemes. We further extend
these ideas to study multi-TA IBE schemes in the following sections.
Here, as throughout, we suppress “IBE”, since all of our work is in the ID-
based setting. We use “RA’ in place of “ANO” because we wish to study two
forms of anonymity, viz recipient anonymity (RA) and TA anonymity (TAA).362 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
Experiment Expm-RA-CCA-b
A (k)
params ← CommonSetup(1
k)
TASet ←∅
∀ta ∈TA ,( mpkta,mskta) ← TASetup(params),
IDSetta ←∅and CSetta ←∅
(ta,id0,id1,m,state) ←
ACorrupt,KeyDer,Dec(find,MPK)
c
∗ ← Enc(mpkta,idb,m)
b
  ←A Corrupt,KeyDer,Dec(guess,c
∗,state)
If m / ∈ MsgSp or id0 = id1 then return 0
If ta / ∈ TASet, id0 / ∈ IDSetta, id1 / ∈ IDSetta,
(id0,c
∗) / ∈ CSetta and (id1,c
∗) / ∈ CSetta then re-
turn b
  else return 0
Oracle Corrupt(ta)
TASet ← TASet ∪{ ta}
Return mskta
Oracle KeyDer(ta,id)
IDSetta ← IDSetta ∪{ id}
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
Return uskid,ta
Oracle Dec(ta,id,c)
CSetta ← CSetta ∪ (id,c)
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
m ← Dec(mpkta,uskid,ta,c)
Return m
Theorem 2. Let atk ∈{ CPA,CCA}. Then for any m-RA-atk adversary A
against a multi-TA IBE scheme with n TAs having advantage ε and running
in time t, there exists an RA-atk adversary B against the corresponding single-
TA IBE scheme with advantage ε
n and running in time O(time(A)).
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and is omitted.
3.3 m-RA-RE-CCA Security
In order to establish the m-RA-CPA/m-RA-CCA security of concrete schemes,
it is helpful to work with a related notion, m-RA-RE-CPA/m-RA-RE-CCA se-
curity. Our treatment here follows that of [1], with appropriate modiﬁcations for
the multi-TA setting.
In handling the challenge phase in the following game, the challenger encrypts
a random message m  in place of the adversary’s choice of message m, hence the
choice “RE” in m-RA-RE-CCA to signify “randomized encryption”.
Experiment Expm-RA-RE-CCA-b
A (k)
params ← CommonSetup(1
k)
TASet ←∅
∀ta ∈TA ,( mpkta,mskta) ← TASetup(params),
IDSetta ←∅and CSetta ←∅
(ta,id0,id1,m,state) ←
ACorrupt,KeyDer,Dec(find,MPK)
m
  $ ← MsgSp with |m
 | = |m|;
c
∗ ← Enc(mpkta,idb,m
 )
b
  ←A Corrupt,KeyDer,Dec(guess,c
∗,state)
If m / ∈ MsgSp or id0 = id1 then return 0
If ta / ∈ TASet, id0 / ∈ IDSetta, id1 / ∈ IDSetta,
(id0,c
∗) / ∈ CSetta and (id1,c
∗) / ∈ CSetta then re-
turn b
  else return 0
Oracle Corrupt(ta)
TASet ← TASet ∪{ ta}
Return mskta
Oracle KeyDer(ta,id)
IDSetta ← IDSetta ∪{ id}
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
Return uskid,ta
Oracle Dec(ta,id,c)
CSetta ← CSetta ∪ (id,c)
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
m ← Dec(mpkta,uskid,ta,c)
Return m
The following result relates the notions of m-RA-atk security and m-RA-RE-
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Lemma 1. Let m-IBE be a multi-TA IBE scheme that is m-IND-atk-secure
and m-RA-RE-atk-secure. Then m-IBE is also m-RA-atk-secure. Here atk ∈
{CPA,CCA}.
Proof. Let A be a poly-time algorithm (PTA) attacking the m-RA-atk security
of a scheme m-IBE. It is easy to construct PTAs A1, A3 attacking the m-IND-
atk security of m-IBE,a n daP T AA2 attacking m-RA-RE-atk security of m-IBE
such that:
Advm-RA-atk
A (k)
= |Pr[Expm-RA-atk-1
A (k)=1 ]− Pr[Expm-RA-atk-0
A (k)=1 ] |
= |Pr[Expm-RA-atk-1
A (k)=1 ]− Pr[Expm-RA-RE-atk-1
A (k)=1 ]
+P r [ Expm-RA-RE-atk-1
A (k)=1 ]− Pr[Expm-RA-RE-atk-0
A (k)=1 ]
+P r [ Expm-RA-RE-atk-0
A (k)=1 ]− Pr[Expm-RA-atk-0
A (k)=1 ] |
≤| Pr[Expm-RA-atk-1
A1 (k)=1 ]− Pr[Expm-RA-RE-atk-1
A1 (k)=1 ] |
+ |Pr[Expm-RA-RE-atk-1
A2 (k)=1 ]− Pr[Expm-RA-RE-atk-0
A2 (k)=1 ] |
+ |Pr[Expm-RA-RE-atk-0
A3 (k)=1 ]− Pr[Expm-RA-atk-0
A3 (k)=1 ] |
≤ Advm-IND-atk
A1 (k)+Advm-RA-RE-atk
A2 (k)+Advm-IND-atk
A3 (k)
3.4 m-TAA-CCA Security
The m-TAA-CCA security notion formalizes TA anonymity: a ciphertext should
not leak which TA’s master public key was used to compute the ciphertext. We
work with chosen ciphertext adversaries in the multi-TA setting. As explained
above, TA anonymity is a necessary condition to achieve fully private communi-
cation thwarting adversarial activity like traﬃc analysis in the multi-TA setting.
Experiment Expm-TAA-CCA-b
A (k)
params ← CommonSetup(1
k)
TASet ←∅
∀ta ∈TA ,( mpkta,mskta) ← TASetup(params),
IDSetta ←∅and CSetta ←∅
(ta0,ta1,id,m,state) ←
ACorrupt,KeyDer,Dec(find,MPK)
c
∗ ← Enc(mpktab,id,m)
b
  ←A Corrupt,KeyDer,Dec(guess,c
∗,state)
If m / ∈ MsgSp or ta0 = ta1 then return 0
If ta0 / ∈ TASet, ta1 / ∈ TASet, id / ∈ IDSetta0,
id / ∈ IDSetta1,( id,c
∗) / ∈ CSetta0 and (id,c
∗) / ∈
CSetta1 then return b
  else return 0
Oracle Corrupt(ta)
TASet ← TASet ∪{ ta}
Return mskta
Oracle KeyDer(ta,id)
IDSetta ← IDSetta ∪{ id}
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
Return uskid,ta
Oracle Dec(ta,id,c)
CSetta ← CSetta ∪ (id,c)
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
m ← Dec(mpkta,uskid,ta,c)
Return m
3.5 m-TAA-RE-CCA Security
Again, when proving m-TAA-RE-CCA security for a concrete scheme it is some-
times easier to work with the related m-TAA-RE-CCA security notion, which
we deﬁne next.364 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
Experiment Expm-TAA-CCA-b
A (k)
params ← CommonSetup(1
k)
TASet ←∅
∀ta ∈TA ,( mpkta,mskta) ← TASetup(params),
IDSetta ←∅and CSetta ←∅
(ta0,ta1,id,m,state) ←
ACorrupt,KeyDer,Dec(find,MPK)
m
  $ ← MsgSp with |m
 | = |m|;
c
∗ ← Enc(mpktab,id,m
 )
b
  ←A Corrupt,KeyDer,Dec(guess,c
∗,state)
If m / ∈ MsgSp or ta0 = ta1 then return 0
If ta0 / ∈ TASet, ta1 / ∈ TASet, id / ∈ IDSetta0,
id / ∈ IDSetta1,( id,c
∗) / ∈ CSetta0 and (id,c
∗) / ∈
CSetta1 then return b
  else return 0.
Oracle Corrupt(ta)
TASet ← TASet ∪{ ta}
Return mskta
Oracle KeyDer(ta,id)
IDSetta ← IDSetta ∪{ id}
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
Return uskid,ta
Oracle Dec(ta,id,c)
CSetta ← CSetta ∪ (id,c)
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
m ← Dec(mpkta,uskid,ta,c)
Return m
Lemma 2. Let m-IBE be a multi-TA IBE scheme that is m-IND-atk-secure
and m-TAA-RE-atk-secure. Then m-IBE is also m-TAA-atk-secure. Here atk ∈
{CPA,CCA}.
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 and is omitted.
3.6 A Combined Security Notion: m-IND-TAA-RA-CCA Security
Finally, we deﬁne an m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA experiment that simultaneously cap-
tures message indistinguishability, recipient anonymity, and TA anonymity in the
multi-TA setting for chosen ciphertext adversaries.
Experiment Expm-IND-RA-TAA-CCA-b
A (k)
params ← CommonSetup(1
k)
TASet ←∅
∀ta ∈TA ,( mpkta,mskta) ← TASetup(params),
IDSetta ←∅and CSetta ←∅
(ta0,ta1,id0,id1,m0,m1,state) ←
ACorrupt,KeyDer,Dec(find,MPK)
c
∗ ← Enc(mpktab,idb,mb)
b
  ←A Corrupt,KeyDer,Dec(guess,c
∗,state)
If {m0,m1}   MsgSp or |m0|  = |m1|
then return 0
If (ta0 = ta1 and id0 = id1 and m0 = m1)
then return 0
If ta0 / ∈ TASet, ta1 / ∈ TASet, id0 / ∈ IDSetta0,
id1 / ∈ IDSetta1,( id0,c
∗) / ∈ CSetta0 and (id1,c
∗) / ∈
CSetta1 then return b
  else return 0.
Oracle Corrupt(ta)
TASet ← TASet ∪{ ta}
Return mskta
Oracle KeyDer(ta,id)
IDSetta ← IDSetta ∪{ id}
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
Return uskid,ta
Oracle Dec(ta,id,c)
CSetta ← CSetta ∪ (id,c)
uskid,ta ← KeyDer(mskta,id)
m ← Dec(mpkta,uskid,ta,c)
Return m
Lemma 3. Let m-IBE be a multi-TA IBE scheme that is m-IND-atk-secure,
m-RA-atk-secure and m-TAA-atk-secure. Then m-IBE is also m-IND-RA-TAA-
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Proof. The proof (informally) follows by noting that if m-IBE is m-TAA-atk-
secure, then the challenger may replace the triple (ta0,id0,m 0)w i t h( ta1,id0,
m0) in its response to the challenge query without the adversary being able
to detect the change. Likewise, using m-RA-atk security, the challenger may
then replace (ta1,id0,m 0)w i t h( ta1,id1,m 0). Finally, using m-IND-atk security,
the challenger can replace (ta1,id1,m 0)w i t h( ta1,id1,m 1), again, without the
adversary being able to detect the change. This informal argument can be made
rigorous using a sequence of games.
A combined m-IND-RA-CCA security notion can also be deﬁned and it is easy
to show that m-IND-RA-CCA security holds for a scheme that has both m-IND-
CCA and m-RA-CCA security, using a similar strategy as above. In the single-TA
setting, we obtain IND-RA-CCA and IND-RA-CPA security notions. The latter
security notion for IBE was used to prove the security of PEKS schemes in [1].
Similarly, we deﬁne combined m-IND-TAA-CPA and m-IND-TAA-CCA security
notions.
4 Extending the Fujisaki-Okamoto Conversion to
Multi-TA IBE Schemes
In two separate but related strands of work, Fujisaki and Okamoto studied the
problem of building Public Key Encryption (PKE) schemes which are secure in
av e r ys t r o n gs e n s e( I N D - C C A )f r o mP K Eschemes which are secure in a weaker
sense.
In [14], Fujisaki and Okamoto gave a generic conversion that takes any OW-
CPA-secure PKE scheme satisfying a mild technical condition (γ-uniformity) and
outputs a PKE scheme that is IND-CCA-secure in the Random Oracle Model.
Yang et al. [25] investigated how to adapt this particular Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO)
technique to the ID-based setting.
Similarly, in [13], Fujisaki and Okamoto gave a generic conversion that takes
any IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme and outputs a PKE scheme that is IND-CCA-
secure in the Random Oracle Model. The security analysis in [13] is signiﬁcantly
simpler than that of [14]. Kitagawa et al. [20] investigated how to modify this
particular FO technique for the ID-based setting.
We now describe a modiﬁed FO conversion for IBE in the multi-TA setting.
We are able to show that in the multi-TA setting, we can apply this modiﬁed
conversion to build an IBE scheme that has m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA security from
an IBE scheme that is m-IND-RA-TAA-CPA-secure and γ-uniform. We extend
the ideas of [13,20]. In particular, we include additional parameters in the input
to the hash function used in the scheme. This allows us to eﬃciently respond to
hash queries, simpliﬁes book-keeping in the proof, and yields a simulation that
has a reduced running time in comparison to an application of the unmodiﬁed
Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation.
We begin by deﬁning a suitable notion ofγ-uniformity for the multi-TA setting.366 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
Deﬁnition 6. Let Π be a multi-TA IBE scheme with space of randomness RSp.
Then Π is said to be γ-uniform if, for any ﬁxed choice of c ∈ CtSp,m∈ MsgSp,
id ∈{ 0,1}∗ and ta ∈TA , we have:
Pr

c = Enc(mpkta,id,m;r):r
$ ← RSp

≤ γ.
Now let Π = {CommonSetup,TASetup,KeyDer,Enc,Dec} be a multi-TA IBE
scheme. Then Π  = {CommonSetup ,TASetup ,KeyDer ,Enc ,Dec } denotes a
new multi-TA IBE scheme with algorithms deﬁned as follows.
Let l0 +l1 be the bit length of messages in Π,w h e r el0 will be the bit length
of messages in Π ,a n dl e tRSp be the space of randomness used by Enc.
– CommonSetup :A si nCommonSetup, but in addition, we pick a hash function
H : {0,1}∗ ×{ 0,1}∗ ×{ 0,1}l0 ×{ 0,1}l1 → RSp.
– TASetup :As in TASetup.
– KeyDer :A si nKeyDer.
– Enc : This algorithm takes as input mpkta for ta ∈TA , id ∈{ 0,1}∗,a n da
message m ∈{ 0,1}l0. Its output is:
Enc
 (mpkta,id,m)=Enc(mpkta,id,m||σ;H(mpkta,id,m,σ))
where σ
$ ←{ 0,1}l1.S oΠ  has randomness space {0,1}l1.
– Dec :L e tc denote a ciphertext to be decrypted using a private key uskid,ta
issued by TA ta with master public key mpkta for identity id. This algorithm
works as follows:
1. Compute m  = Dec(mpkta,uskid,ta,c).
2. Let m =[ m ]l0 and σ =[ m ]l1 where [a]b and [a]b denote the ﬁrst and
last b bits of a string a respectively.
3. Test if Enc(mpkta,id,m||σ;H(mpkta,id,m,σ)) = c. If not output ⊥;
otherwise output m as the decryption of c.
Theorem 3. Modelling H as a random oracle, if Π is a multi-TA IBE scheme
that is m-IND-RA-TAA-CPA-secure and γ-uniform for some negligible γ,t h e n
Π  is m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA-secure.
In more detail, suppose Π is a γ-uniform IBE encryption scheme. Let A be
an m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA adversary which has advantage  (k) against Π  and
which runs in time t(k).S u p p o s eA makes at most qH queries to H,a tm o s t
qE extraction queries, and at most qD decryption queries. Suppose further that
executing Enc once needs at most time τ. Then there is an m-IND-RA-TAA-
CPA adversary B which has advantage at least   (k) against Π, with running
time t (k), such that
  (k)=2 (
  +1
2
−
qh
2l1 − 1
)(1 − γ)qd − 1
and
t
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Proof. Suppose there is an m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA adversary A against Π  with
advantage  (k) and running in time t(k). We show how to construct an adversary
B that uses A to break the m-IND-RA-TAA-CPA-security of Π
B’s input is the set of all master public keys MPK. B gives A the set MPK.
A also has access to random oracle H that is controlled by B. A then makes a
series of queries which B answers as follows.
–H - q u e r i e s : B maintains a list of tuples  mpki,idi,mi,σ i,g i,c i . We refer to
this list as the Hlist. The list is initially empty.
When A makes a H query on (mpk,id,m,σ), B responds as follows:
• If the query (mpk,id,m,σ) already appears in a tuple
 mpki,idi,mi,σ i,g i,c i  then B responds with H(mpk,id,m,σ)=gi.
• Otherwise B picks g
$ ← RSp, generates c = Enc(mpkta,id,m||σ;g),
adds the tuple  mpk,id,m,σ,g,c  to the Hlist and responds to A with
H(mpk,id,m,σ)=g.
– Corrupt Queries: If A issues a TA corrupt query on ta ∈TA ,t h e nB sim-
ply relays this query to its challenger, which responds with the corresponding
master secret key mskta. B then passes the resulting key to A.
– Extraction Queries: If A issues an extraction query on (ta,id), then B for-
wards (ta,id) to its challenger, which responds with the private key uskid,ta.
B forwards this key to A.
– Decryption Queries: If A issues a decryption query on (ta,id,c), A re-
sponds as follows:
• Searches for a tuple  mpki,idi,mi,σ i,g i,c i  from the Hlist such that
mpkta = mpki, id = idi and c = ci.
• If such a tuple exists, then outputs m, else outputs ⊥.
– Challenge: A outputs data (ta0,ta1,id0,id1,m0,m1)o nw h i c hi tw i s h e st o
be challenged. This data is subject to the usual restrictions (see Section 3.6).
B chooses two l1 bit strings σ0 and σ1 uniformly at random, subject to the
condition that they be distinct, and sends (ta0,ta1,id0,id1,m0||σ0,m1||σ1)
to its challenger. B’s challenger picks a random bit b and sets
c
∗ = Enc(mpktab,idb,mb||σb;r)
where r ∈ RSp. B forwards c∗ to A.
After the Challenge query has been issued, if the adversary A makes a hash
oracle query on either (ta0,id0,m0,σ 0)o r( ta1,id1,m1,σ 1) then the adversary
B simply outputs b  =0o rb  = 1, respectively, as its guess for the value of the
bit b. If neither hash query is made then, at the end of A’s attack, B simply
outputs the same bit b  that A outputs. B wins if b  = b. This completes our
description of the simulation.
Our analysis now follows closely the analysis in [13]. We deﬁne the following
events and probabilities.
Let Pr[SuccA] be the probability that adversary A outputs a bit b  = b.
Similarly, let Pr[SuccB] be the probability that adversary B outputs a bit b  = b.
For notational convenience, we let   denote A’s advantage in the simulation.368 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
Let Askb be the event that A asks a hash query that coincides with(mpktab,
idb,mb,σ b)a n dAsk¯ b be the event that A asks a hash query that coincides with
(mpkta¯ b,id¯ b,m¯ b,σ ¯ b). Notice that these two queries are distinct because σ0  = σ1.
We deﬁne F to be the event that B fails to answer a decryption query correctly
at some point during the game so that Pr[¬F] is the probability that B answers
all decryption queries correctly during the simulation. Now,
Pr[SuccA]=P r [ SuccA|Askb] · Pr[Askb]
+Pr[SuccA|(¬Askb) ∧ Ask¯ b] · Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Ask¯ b)]
+Pr[SuccA|(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Ask¯ b)] · Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Ask¯ b)].
Similarly,
Pr[SuccB]=P r [ SuccB|Askb] · Pr[Askb]
+Pr[SuccB|(¬Askb) ∧ Ask¯ b] · Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Ask¯ b)]
+Pr[SuccB|(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Ask¯ b)] · Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Ask¯ b)].
From the conditions of the simulation, we have the following:
Pr[SuccB|Askb]=1 ,
Pr[SuccB|(¬Askb) ∧ Ask¯ b]=0 ,
Pr[SuccA|(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Ask¯ b)] = Pr[SuccB|(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Ask¯ b)].
Therefore,
Pr[SuccB] − Pr[SuccA]=P r [ Askb](1 − Pr[SuccA|Askb])
+Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Ask¯ b](0 − Pr[SuccA|(¬Askb ∧ Ask¯ b)])
≥−Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Ask¯ b].
Since even a computationally unbounded adversary has no information about
what the string σ¯ b i s( e x c e p tt h a ti ti sd i s t i n c tf r o mσb and so is uniformly
distributed on a set of size 2l1 −1), and our adversary makes at most qh queries
to the oracle H,w ei n f e rt h a tP r [ ( ¬Askb) ∧ Ask¯ b] ≤
qh
2l1−1. Hence,
Pr[SuccB] ≥ Pr[SuccA] − Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Ask¯ b]
≥  +1
2 −
qh
2l1−1.
The event F occurs only when A submits a decryption query (ta,id,c) such that
c = Enc(mpkta,id,m||σ;H(mpkta,id,m,σ))
w i t h o u tﬁ r s tq u e r y i n gH on input (mpkta,id,m,σ). Now observe that, given
values ta,id,c, there is at most one possible message m  = m||σ that could
result from decrypting ciphertext c under the private key uskid,ta,n a m e l ym  =
Dec(mpkta,uskid,ta,c). Applying the deﬁnition of γ-uniformity, and noting that
the randomness r that would be used to form c for the scheme Π  is still uniformly
distributed whenever the relevant hash query has not been made, we see that
B fails to properly answer each decryption query with probability at most γ.
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Hence, we have
AdvB(k)=2P r [ SuccB] · Pr[¬F] − 1 ≥ 2(
  +1
2
−
qh
2l1 − 1
)(1 − γ)qd − 1.
For the running time analysis, note that in addition to the running time of
A, the adversary B has to run the encryption algorithm Enc at most qh times.
Therefore t (k)=O(t(k)+qhτ). 
Notice that the above theorem as stated requires the initial scheme Π to have
all three security properties (IND, RA and TAA) in order to convert from CPA-
security to CCA-security. In fact, it is easy to prove versions of Theorem 3 that
convert IND-RA-CPA security to IND-RA-CCA security and IND-TAA-CPA
security to IND-TAA-CCA security. However, the proof technique does not allow
us to prove that the conversion preserves either of our anonymity properties in
isolation – we need the base scheme Π to also be IND-secure.
We leave as an open problem to ﬁnd a modiﬁed version of the “other” FO
conversion (from [14]) that preserves anonymity properties in the multi-TA
setting.
4.1 Applying the Modiﬁed FO Conversion to BasicIdent
We describe and analyse a multi-TA scheme m-BasicIdent that is based on the
scheme BasicIdent from [6]. This scheme is deﬁned as follows:
CommonSetup(1
k):
– (G,GT,e,q,P) ← PairingGen(1
k).
– Output params =
(G,GT,e,q,P,H 1,H 2,n)w h e r e
H1 : {0,1}
∗ → G, H2 : GT →{ 0,1}
n
for some n = n(k).
– MsgSp = {0,1}
n, CtSp = G1 ×{ 0,1}
n,
RSp = Zq.
TASetup(params)
– Set s
$ ← Zq,Q= sP.
– Set mpk =( params,Q).
– Set msk = s.
– Output (mpk,msk).
KeyDer
H1(ta,id):
– Set uskid,ta = mskta · H1(id).
– Output uskid,ta.
Enc
H1,H2(ta,id,m):
– Parse mpkta as (params,Qta).
– Set r
$ ← Zq.
– Set T = e(H1(id),Qta)
r.
– Output c =( rP,m ⊕ H2(T)).
Dec
H2(ta,uskid,ta,c):
– Parse c as (U,V ).
– Set T = e(uskid,ta,U).
– Output m = V ⊕ H2(T).
The scheme m-BasicIdent.
We next show the scheme that results from applying the modiﬁed Fujisaki-
Okamoto tranformation to the m-BasicIdent scheme above.370 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
CommonSetup
 (1
k):
– (G,GT,e,q,P) ← PairingGen(1
k).
– Output params =
(G,GT,e,q,P,H 1,H 2,H 3,l 0,l 1,n)
where H1 : {0,1}
∗ → G,
H2 : GT →{ 0,1}
n for some n = n(k),
l0 +l1 = n,a n dH3 : {0,1}
∗ ×{0,1}
∗ ×
{0,1}
l0 ×{ 0,1}
l1 → Zq.
– MsgSp = {0,1}
l0, CtSp = G1 ×{0,1}
n,
RSp = {0,1}
l1.
TASetup
 :A si nTASetup
KeyDer
 :A si nKeyDer
Enc
H1,H2,H3(ta,id,m):
– Parse mpkta as (params,Qta).
– Set σ
$ ←{ 0,1}
l1.
– Set r = H3(mpkta,id,m,σ).
– Set T = e(H1(id),Qta)
r.
– Output c =( rP,(m||σ) ⊕ H2(T)).
Dec
H2,H3(ta,uskid,ta,c):
– Parse c as (U,V ).
– Set T = e(uskid,ta,U).
– Set m
  = V ⊕ H2(T).
– Set m =[ m
 ]
l0 and σ =[ m
 ]l1.
– Test if r = H3(mpkta,id,m,σ).
If not, output ⊥; otherwise output
m as the decryption of c.
The scheme FO-m-BasicIdent.
Lemma 4. The multi-TA scheme m-BasicIdent is m-IND-CPA-secure, assum-
ing the hardness of the BDH problem in groups output by PairingGen.
Proof. The single-TA scheme corresponding to m-BasicIdent is nothing other
than the Boneh-Franklin BasicIdentscheme, whose IND-CPA security is known
to rest on the hardness of the BDH problem in groups output by PairingGen
[6]. Now apply Theorem 1.
The following result is an extension of a result from [1] that showed that the
BasicIdent scheme has recipient anonymity against CPA attackers.
Lemma 5. The multi-TA scheme m-BasicIdent is m-RA-CPA-secure and m-
TAA-CPA-secure, assuming the hardness of the BDH problem in groups output
by PairingGen.
Proof. Ciphertexts c in the m-BasicIdent scheme have two parts, namely U =
rP and V = m ⊕ H2(T). The value U is chosen uniformly at random from G.
If the message m is chosen uniformly at random from {0,1}n then V is also
distributed uniformly in {0,1}n and is independent of H2(T). Thus, in both 0
and 1 worlds of the m-RA-RE-CPA and m-TAA-RE-CPA games, the ciphertext c
has exactly the same distribution and any adversary in these RE games will have
zero advantage. By Lemma 4, m-BasicIdent is m-IND-CPA-secure. Applying
Lemmas 1 and 2 yields m-RA-CPA and m-TAA-CPA security for m-BasicIdent,
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Lemma 6. The m-BasicIdent scheme is γ-uniform for γ =1 /q.
Proof. In the m-BasicIdent scheme, the ﬁrst component of the ciphertext is
U = rP where r
$ ← Zq. It is them immediate that m-BasicIdent is γ uniform
with γ =1 /q.
Theorem 4. The scheme FO-m-BasicIdent obtained by applying the modiﬁed
FO conversion to the scheme m-BasicIdent is m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA-secure,
assuming the hardness of the BDH problem in groups output by PairingGen.
Proof. We obtain the above result by combining Lemmas 4, 5 with Lemmas 3,
6a n dT h e o r e m3 .
Thus we have obtained an eﬃcient multi-TA IBE scheme enjoying indistinguisha-
bility, recipient anonymity and TA anonymity for the CCA setting, in the random
oracle model. We note as a corollary of our analysis that the single-TA version
of our scheme oﬀers recipient anonymity. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst such result for a CCA-secure variant of BasicIdent.
4.2 Applying the Modiﬁed FO Conversion to the Sakai-Kasahara
IBE Scheme
The Sakai-Kasahara IBE scheme [21] has an alternative (and attractive) private
key extraction algorithm compared to the Boneh-Franklin scheme. We deﬁne
m-BasicSK, a multi-TA version of this scheme using symmetric pairings, imme-
diately below, and then provide a sketch security analysis.
CommonSetup(1
k):
– (G,GT,e,q,P) ← PairingGen(1
k).
– Output params =
(G,GT,e,q,P,Z,H 1,H 2,n)w h e r e
Z = e(P,P) ∈ GT, H1 : {0,1}
∗ → Zq,
H2 : GT →{ 0,1}
n for some n = n(k).
– MsgSp = {0,1}
n, CtSp = G1 ×{ 0,1}
n,
RSp = Zq.
TASetup(params)
– Set s
$ ← Zq,Q= sP.
– Set mpk =( params,Q).
– Set msk = s.
– Output (mpk,msk).
KeyDer
H1(ta,id):
– Output
uskid,ta =
1
mskta +H1(id) · P.
Enc
H1,H2(ta,id,m):
– Parse mpkta as (params,Qta).
– Set r
$ ← Zq.
– Set U = rQta + rH1(id)P.
– Output c =( U,m ⊕ H2(Z
r)).
Dec
H2(ta,uskid,ta,c):
– Parse c as (U,V ).
– Set T = e(uskid,ta,U).
– Output m = V ⊕ H2(T).
The scheme m-BasicSK.372 K.G. Paterson and S. Srinivasan
The IND-CPA security of the single-TA scheme corresponding to m-BasicSK
can be proved by making small modiﬁcations to the proof of [11, Theorem 2],
which established the OW-CPA security of a closely related scheme based on the
hardness of the  -BDHI problem in groups output by PairingGen(for some value
  related to the number of queries made by the adversary). Using Theorem 1, we
can deduce that m-BasicSK is m-IND-CPA-secure under the same assumption.
It is then easy to establish that m-BasicSK is m-RA-CPA-secure and m-TAA-
CPA-secure; this requires a similar analysis as in Lemma 5. Moreover, m-BasicSK
is γ-uniform for γ =1 /q. We may now apply Theorem 3 to deduce that the
scheme FO-m-BasicSK that is obtained by applying our modiﬁed FO conversion
to m-BasicSK is m-IND-RA-TAA-CCA-secure, assuming the hardness of the  -
BDHI problem in groups output by PairingGen.
Thus we have obtained a second eﬃcient multi-TA IBE scheme enjoying in-
distinguishability, recipient anonymity and TA anonymity for the CCA setting,
in the random oracle model. Our CCA-secure scheme has roughly the same per-
formance as the KEM-DEM-derived scheme of [11], but oﬀers stronger proven
anonymity guarantees. We also note that even the recipient anonymity of the
single-TA version of m-BasicSK was not previously known – indeed this is ex-
plicitly claimed not to hold in [7].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have given a formal analysis of various security and anonymity notions for
multi-TA IBE schemes and the relationships between them. We have also in-
vestigated a modiﬁed Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation for IBE and shown that
this transformation preserves our security and anonymity notions when building
a CCA-secure scheme from a CPA-secure one. We investigated the application
of this transformation to the Boneh-Franklin BasicIdent scheme and to the
Sakai-Kasahara scheme.
In future work, we will investigate further speciﬁc IBE schemes and see if
they meet the multi-TA security notions introduced in this paper. In particular,
it will be interesting to examine the IND-RA-atk-secure IBE schemes of Gentry
[16] and see if they can also be proven to be TAA-atk-secure We raised the
possibility of adapting the “other” FO conversion of [14] so as to preserve our
multi-TA security notions. Another open problem suggested by this work is
its generalization to the hierarchical IBE (HIBE) setting, where the anonymity
properties of ciphertexts generated using diﬀerent root TA master public keys
could be studied.
Finally, the subject of robustness of IBE in the single-TA and multi-TA
settings requires further investigation: when using an IND-RA-TA-CCA-secure
scheme in practice in a fully anonymous communications system, users will need
to be able to decide whether or not a ciphertext is intended for their consump-
tion. Seemingly the only way for a user to do this is to attempt a trial decryption
using his private key, relying on the decryption algorithm to reject the ciphertext
if the wrong private key has been used. However, there is nothing intrinsic to ourSecurity and Anonymity of IBE with Multiple Trusted Authorities 373
formal deﬁnitions or security models that guarantees that decryption will always
output “⊥” when the wrong private key is used, though such a robustness prop-
erty is clearly desirable (as it would prevent attacks where an adversary fooled a
user into decrypting a ciphertext intended for another party to obtain a mean-
ingful message upon which the decrypting party might then act). Robustness in
this sense for standard public key encryption and IBE schemes is the subject of
a recent paper of Abdalla et al. [2]. It would be interesting to attempt to extend
their results to the multi-TA setting, but it should be noted that the authors
of [2] have already established that the FO conversion of [14] does not preserve
robustness in general.
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